Risk and Safety

in

Civil, Surveying and Environmental Engineering

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Contents of Today's Lecture

- Introduction to structural systems reliability
- General systems reliability analysis
- Mechanical modelling of systems
- Reliability analysis for structural systems
- Risk based assessment of structural robustness



Introduction to structural systems reliability

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Until now we have focused on the reliability of individual failure modes

- Reliability analyses of components



This problem complex is addressed by the theory of

- structural systems reliability analysis





Probabilistic characteristics of systems

Block diagrams are normally used in the representation of systems in structural systems reliability analysis

Each component in the block diagrams represent one failure mode for the structure

a) series systemb) parallel systemc) mixed system



Uncorrelated components

The failure probability of a series system may be determined by

The failure probability of a parallel system may be determined by

$$P_F = 1 - P_S = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^n (1 - P(F_i))$$

$$P_F = \prod_{i=1}^n P(F_i)$$



Correlated components

If the individual components of the systems have linear and normally distributed safety margins

The failure probability of a series system may be determined by

The failure probability of a parallel system may be determined by

$$P_F = 1 - P_S = 1 - \Phi_n(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\rho})$$

 $P_F = \Phi_n(-\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\rho})$



Simple bounds on systems reliability

The failure probability of a series system may be bounded by

$$\max_{i=1}^{n} \{P(F_i)\} \le P_F \le 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{n} (1 - P(F_i))$$

Full correlation

Uncorrelated

The failure probability of a parallel system may be bounded by

$$\prod_{i=1}^{n} P(F_i) \le P_F \le \max_{i=1}^{n} \left\{ P(F_i) \right\}$$

Uncorrelated

Full correlation



Example

We consider a structural system for which failure is represented by the following block diagram

The components have the following failure probabilities

The components may be correlated



$$P(F_1) = P(F_2) = P(F_4) = 1 \cdot 10^{-2}$$

$$P(F_3) = P(F_5) = P(F_6) = 1 \cdot 10^{-5}$$



Example

How can we in a simplified manner analyse such a mixed system of series and parallel systems in combination

We can reduce it into subsystems sequentially: either into series systems or parallel systems





Systems reliability analysis

Example

If we assume uncorrelated components we have

$$P(5 \cup 6) = 1 - (1 - 1 \cdot 10^{-5})^2 = 2 \cdot 10^{-5}$$

$$P(4 \cap \{5 \cup 6\}) = 1 \cdot 10^{-2} \times 2 \cdot 10^{-5} = 2 \cdot 10^{-7}$$

 $P(1 \cap 2 \cap 3) = (1 \cdot 10^{-2})^2 (1 \cdot 10^{-5}) = 1 \cdot 10^{-9}$



 $P_{S,\rho=0} = P(\{1 \cap 2 \cap 3\} \cup \{4 \cap \{5 \cup 6\}\}) = 1 - (1 - 2 \cdot 10^{-7})(1 - 1 \cdot 10^{-9}) = 2.01 \cdot 10^{-7}$

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Systems reliability analysis

Example

If we assume correlated components we have

$$P(5 \cup 6) = \max(1 \cdot 10^{-5}, 1 \cdot 10^{-5}) = 1 \cdot 10^{-5}$$

$$P(4 \cap \{5 \cup 6\}) = \min(1 \cdot 10^{-2}, 1 \cdot 10^{-5}) = 1 \cdot 10^{-5}$$

 $P(1 \cap 2 \cap 3) = \min(1 \cdot 10^{-2}, 1 \cdot 10^{-2}, 1 \cdot 10^{-5}) = 1 \cdot 10^{-5}$

$$10^{-5}$$

$$P_{S,\rho=1} = P(\{1 \cap 2 \cap 3\} \cup \{4 \cap \{5 \cup 6\}\}) = \max(1 \cdot 10^{-5}, 1 \cdot 10^{-5})$$
$$P_{S,\rho=1} = 1 \cdot 10^{-5}$$

The simple bounds are $2.01 \cdot 10^{-7}$

$2.01 \cdot 10^{-7} \le P_s \le 1 \cdot 10^{-5}$

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Brittle behaviour



Parallel systems with ductile components

Assume a parallel system with n ductile components

The second order statistics of the strength are then given by

$$\mu_{R_{S}} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mu_{R_{i}} \qquad \sigma_{R_{S}}^{2} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sigma_{R_{i}}^{2}$$

Furthermore we have that the strength is normally distributed – central limit theorem

Parallel systems with ductile components

If $\mu_{R_1} = \mu_{R_2} = ... = \mu_{R_n} = \mu$ and $\sigma_{R_1} = \sigma_{R_2} = ... = \sigma_{R_n} = \sigma$ then we have:

The uncertainty of the strength of parallel systems approaches zero for large *n*

$$\mu_{R_{S}} = n \cdot r_{0} (1 - F_{R}(r_{0}))$$

$$\sigma_{R_{S}}^{2} = n \cdot r_{0}^{2} F_{R}(r_{0}) (1 - F_{R}(r_{0}))$$

$$r(1 - F_{R}(r))$$

$$COV = \frac{\sqrt{F_{R}(r_{0})(1 - F_{R}(r_{0}))}}{\sqrt{n}(1 - F_{R}(r_{0}))}$$

 $COV = \frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{n} \cdot \mu}$

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Methods of structural systems reliability analysis

In principle two different approaches to reliability analysis of structural systems may be followed

namely the

- β -unzipping method
- fundamental mechanism method

we will consider an example





Example

The bending moment capacity *R* and the loading *F* on the beam structure are assumed to be normal distributed

Following the β -unzipping method failure of a structural system may be defined at different levels – where levels corresponds to the number of failed failure modes assumed to be associated with failure of the structure.



$$\mu_R=300, \sigma_R=30$$

$$\mu_F=100, \sigma_R=20$$



Example

Assuming that bending failures will occur at location A or location B the block diagram to be considered is a simple series system

The limit state functions for moment failure at locations A and B are easily established as

FORM analysis yields

the simple bounds yields





Example

If systems failure is defined by the event that two failure modes have failed the system to be considered is given by the mixed system

at the location of failures fictitious forces are introduced corresponding to the moment capacity

the limit state equations are found as:

FORM analysis yields:



$$P_{f,B|A} = 1.47 \cdot 10^{-3}$$
 $P_{f,A|B} = 1.47 \cdot 10^{-3}$



Example

We can now calculate the simple bounds for the parallel system as:



 $1.41 \cdot 10^{-5} \le P(A \cap B | A) \le 9.58 \cdot 10^{-3}$

 $6.71 \cdot 10^{-7} \le P(B \cap A | B) \le 1.47 \cdot 10^{-3}$

and finally the simple bounds for the series system as:

 $1.48 \cdot 10^{-5} \le P_f \le 9.58 \cdot 10^{-3}$



Example

Following the fundamental mechanism approach failure of the considered structure is defined as the development of a collapse mechanism for the structure

Considering our simple example there is only one bending failure mechanism

which is readily analysed



 $P_f = 1.47 \cdot 10^{-3}$







- Despite modernization of design codes the engineering profession is still facing problems in terms of
 - collapsing structures and building
 - steady increase of insured damages



• Examples of collapses

Bad Reichenhalle Germany, 2006





Examples of collapses

Siemens arena Denmark, 2003





• Examples of collapses

Oklahoma City bombing USA, 1995





• Examples of collapses

World Trade Center USA, 2001





• Examples of collapses

Charles de Gaulle France, 2004





• Losses due to building failures



rate papers, published in the 1990s by the WTCB (Belgian Building Research Institute) as well as Matouzek and Schneider



Insured losses due to building failures

IRV Interkantonaler Rückversicherungsverband, Switzerland



Quelle: Schadenstatistik VKF



What is understood as robustness

Structural Standards	The consequences of structural failure are not disproportional to the effect causing the failure [2].		
Software Engineering	The abilityto react appropriately to abnormal circumstances (i.e., circumstances "outside of specifications"). A system may be correct without being robust [17].		
Product Development and QC	The measure of the capacity of a production process to remain unaffected by small but deliberate variations of internal parameters so as to provide an indication of the reliability during normal use.		
Ecosystems	The ability of a system to maintain function even with changes in internal structure or external environment [18].		
Control Theory	The degree to which a system is insensitive to effects that are not considered in the design [19].		
Statistics	A robust statistical technique is insensitive against small deviations in the assumptions [20].		
Design Optimization	A robust solution in an optimization problem is one that has the best performance under its worst case (max-min rule) [21].		
Bayesian Decision Making	By introducing a wide class of priors and loss functions, the elements of subjectivity and sensitivity to a narrow class of choices, are both reduced [22]		
Language	The robustness of languageis a measure of the ability of human speakers to communicate despite incomplete information, ambiguity, and the constant element of surprise [23].		

Which are the attributes of robustness

- Design codes have so far focussed on inherent properties of the structures (components)
 - redundancy
 - ductility
- More recently focus has been directed to:
 - system performance (removal of members)
 - structural ties



Which are the attributes of robustness

The material loss cost consequences due to the collapse of the two WTC towers only comprised 1/4 of the total costs due to damaged or lost material

It seems relevant to include consequences in the robustness equation !

and these are scenario dependent !





Which are the attributes of robustness

• The system definition is important because it defines the consequences following structural failures





How to frame robustness

 Engineered systems have certain characteristics of generic nature – concept developed in the JCSS





How to frame robustness

This concept is also the idea behind the Eurocodes





How to frame robustness

Scenario representation	Physical characteristics	Indicators	Potential consequences
Exposure	Flood Ship impact Explosion/Fire Earthquake Vehicle impact Wind loads Traffic loads Deicing salt Water Carbon dioxide	Use/functionality Location Environment Design life Societal importance	
Vulnerability	Yielding Rupture Cracking Fatigue Wear Spalling Erosion Corrosion	Design codes Design target reliability Age Materials Quality of workmanship Condition Protective measures	Direct consequences Repair costs Temporary loss or reduced functionality Small number of injuries/fatalities Minor socio-economic losses Minor damages to environment
Robustness	Loss of functionality partial collapse full collapse	Ductility Joint characteristics Redundancy Segmentation Condition control/monitoring Emergency preparedness	Indirect consequences Repair costs Temporary loss or reduced functionality Mid to large number of injuries/fatalities Moderate to major socio-economic losses Moderate to major damages to environment

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- Desirable properties of a robustness measure
 - Applicable to general systems
 - Allows for ranking of alternative systems
 - Provides a criterion for identifying acceptable robustness





An assessment framework











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Features of the proposed index

I_{Rob} = <u>Direct Risk</u> Direct Risk + Indirect Risk

- Assumes values between zero and one
- Measures relative risk only
- Dependent upon the probability of damage occurrence
- Dependent upon consequences



- The framework easily facilitates decision analysis
 - Choice of the physical system
 - Choice of inspection and repair
 - Choices to reduce consequences





- "Conditional robustness" is a useful extension of the framework helpful for events such as terrorist attacks
 - Helpful for communication, using a scenario event
 - Can be easily used to calculate (marginal) robustness





- Robustness-based design
 - Acceptable levels of direct risk are achieved by other design requirements
 - Here the goal is indirect risk-reduction
 - Choices are facilitated using the decision trees in this framework
 - The choices can be framed as an optimization problem





- Robustness-based design options:
 - Change structural detailing to provide load transfer
 - Increase redundancy of elements
 - Reduce consequences of failure
 - Reduce exposures
 - Add inspection and maintenance to address deterioration damage



- Robustness-based design calibration
 - By benchmarking the robustness of a variety of structures, general patterns can be found
 - This should lead to simplified requirements that do not require complete risk assessments

Example - Structural Systems

- Parallel system with *n* elements
- Subjected to different types of exposures
- Perfect ductile / brittle
- Load distribution after component failure
- Element damage / system failure
- The one element case represents series systems
- Consequences of system failure is set equal to 100 times the consequences of component failure

A simplified event/decision tree is considered

Exposures

Number of components – ductile material

I_{Rob} 1.0 CoV = 0.1- The greater the number of components, the more robust 0.8 0.6 CoV=0.2 - One component – Small robustness 0.4 - One component – Series system 0.2 CoV=0.3 0.0 2 3 5 9 1 4 6 7 8 10 n

Load variability – ductile material

- Higher CoV leads to less robustness
- Higher Cov increases the probability that the system fails if one component is damaged
- Here uncorrelated resistance is assumed
- Correlation has the same effect as reducing the number of components

Load variability – brittle material

- No residual carrying capacity
- Cascading system failure
- The robustness is close to zero
- Indirect risks are dominating
- Probabilities for damage states are low – or failure consequences high

Failure Consequences

- The higher the indirect consequences, the lower the robustness
- Increase the robustness with
 - effective egress routes
 - decisions in rescue action
 - effective warning systems
- Effect of increasing the damage consequences
- -The robustness is related to reliability

Load redistribution

- How is the load carried by the structure? Tie together or accept local failure?
- Load redistribution might increase system failure probability
- Indirect consequences occur in the case of local failure
- In some cases it is better to tie the structure together but not in all cases.
- This robustness assessment can help to identify the proper strategy

Extraordinary loads / repair actions

Extraordinary loads / repair actions

- Random load in time + accidental loss of one component
- The structure is more robust when damage can be detected
- The robustness is also affected by actions such as monitoring and repair
- Imperfect damage detection or partial repairs can easily be included

Conditional robustness

Loss of one component is assumed 1.
 Provides information about structural performance 0.
 Other damage states can be investigated 0.
 Useful if the triggering event or the probability is unknown 0.
 Different strategies can be investigated 0.
 Different strategies can be investigated 0.
 Different strategies can be investigated 0.

